

**OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM**

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

**Department of State**

**SECRET**

Classification

Authority *MD 901068*  
By HK-M MSG *shh/91*

RPTD SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS 3391 (EXORXKDDINB8400)  
Info to: " LONDON 8217  
" BONN 2107  
" MOSCOW 1456

Origin

Info:

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

**VERBATIM TEXT**

PARIS FOR HILLEBRAND

Re Deptel March 14 to Paris 3390, repeated London 8211  
Bonn 2106 Moscow 1455, and Paris Embtel 3330 and 3347  
March 13 Department.

FYI and guidance following is text Acting Secretary's  
reply British Ambassador's note March 13 regarding Macmillan  
talks:

QUOTE I appreciated very much the promptness of your  
report on the principal results of the Prime Minister's  
talks with Adenauer and brought your letter of March 13  
immediately to the attention of the President. He has  
asked me to let you know and to ask you to inform the  
Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary of his concern about  
several aspects of this report.

First of all, on the question of the proposed commitment  
to a definite date for the Summit Conference, we ~~feel~~ feel

Drafted by:

EUR:FDKohler:bd 3-14-59

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

*FDK* Foy D. Kohler, EUR

Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Merchant (in draft)

The Acting Secretary (in draft)

S/S-R.Miller *PLM*

*PLM* Approved in draft  
by the President

**SECRET**

Classification

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"  
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS  
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

901068 -101

1 MAR 15 FM 1 31  
07362  
R  
RE THE RMR CENTRAL FILES  
THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED  
FOR DCPF USE ONLY.

762-00/3-1359

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

strongly that if we give Khrushchev a date at this point the Foreign Ministers Conference would be condemned to sterility. On the other hand, if we indicated that as a minimum the Foreign Ministers meeting would have to reveal some prospects for serious Summit negotiations, then we would enhance the chances of getting something constructive out of the May meeting. Moreover, the policy which we consistently followed throughout the exhaustive exchanges of last year -- that a Summit meeting could only be accepted if preparations gave a real prospect for reaching agreement on significant subjects -- ~~it~~ is well known to Moscow, as well as to our own peoples. Recession from this position at this stage would risk giving a dangerous impression of weakness. Actually, the President himself agrees that we should be relatively forthcoming in our reply as regards a Summit Conference and personally proposed the new formula which we have introduced into the Working Group in Paris as follows:

"Assuming that the Foreign Ministers meeting gives promise of ~~substantive~~ progress at a Summit Conference, this Government would be happy to participate in such a Summit Conference at any reasonable place and time.".

Supplementing this, we think it would be possible to allow our Ambassadors in Moscow to indicate to the Soviets that a Summit

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

901068 - 102

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

Conference might be contemplated next summer provided there was satisfactory progress at the Foreign Ministers Conference. / ~~XX~~ Under the natural assumption that the conference were held outside the United States, it should be borne in mind that our constitutional system puts severe limits on continuously the time the President can be/out of the country. This is possible for only a few days.

is that we see less danger Our own basic estimate/~~seemaxtexhexxremewhxxatxxeranee withxthatxextxforthxinxxyxxletterxxinxtxexxxexxxdanger~~ than you apparently do of the Russians taking precipitate action with respect to access or the threatened conclusion of a separate peace treaty with East Germany. In fact, we had received the impression from the reports of the Prime Minister's talks with Khrushchev that you felt that danger of precipitate unilateral action by the Russians had lessened.

As you know, our formulation of the agenda item was taken deliberately from the Communiqué concluding the Prime Minister's talks in Moscow with Mr. Khrushchev and hence represents a formulation to which the Russians have publicly subscribed. We think it would be difficult for them to turn this down. Of course, the French think that we should be even more specific and the problem might be met by adding a sentence in our note to any of the four participating governments to the effect that: "Naturally, ~~theWankasxStatexaxmark~~ should have the opportunity ~~xaxxxexxtheaxxright~~ to raise for discussion any question which it

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

901068 - 103

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

~~MAXXCONSIDERXRELEVANTXTOTHEPROBLEMXUNDERXCONSIDERATIONXX~~

may consider relevant to the problems under consideration.". This seems close to the approach suggested in the British text tabled in Paris.

Except for the question of fixing a date for the Summit Conference, we had had the impression from your letter of March 9 and from reports of our representative on the Working Group in Paris that there was in fact little substantial difference in the views of the four Governments on the content of our reply to the latest Soviet note. Frankly, we had hoped that it would be possible for the Working Group to finish coordinating the replies this week so that they could be delivered to Moscow even before the Prime Minister's arrival here. It had seemed to us that this might produce some useful reactions from Moscow which the President and Prime Minister could take into account in their talks. We recognize that this time schedule may no longer ~~be~~ be possible. However, we still think that the Working Group should get on with the job without delay, and that if the matter of commitment to a specific date for a Summit Conference were dropped, <sup>We</sup> there should be no difficulty in prompt agreement. ~~Exxxxxx~~ hope you will agree to this.

Charge

I am informing the German ~~Charge~~ here regarding the substance of this letter and asking him to pass our views along to Bonn. UNQUOTE

END VERBATIM TEXT

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

*Hester  
Acting  
HERTER  
CDR*

901068 - 104